Rudolf Carnap, `Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4 (1950), pp. 20-40.
 Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 74.
 See, for example, Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982 and the literature prompted by it. The problems should not, though, lead us to infer that we cannot know how someone is representing things to be when they speak or write (Should we stop asking people the way to coffee shops?) or that usage is not central (Should we tell dictionary makers to change their ways?).
 For the connection between the correspondence theory and representation, see Marian David, Correspondence and Disquotation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 31-51.
 Huw Price, Time's Arrow & Archimedes' Point, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 4. He argues that the Archimedean view of time, the view from nowhen, as he puts it, delivers a version of the block view.
 See, e.g., Ruth Millikan, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993, Colin McGinn, Mental Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. 143ff, and David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993, ch. 3.
 A view we might call linguistic idealism, as Mark Sainsbury pointed out to me. Traditional idealists allow that much of language represents without creating, though what is represented is the nature of actual and possible patterns in ideas. This, however, is plausible only as a view about language in their mouths. As David Lewis, `Noneism or Allism?', Mind, 99 (1990), pp. 23-31, argues, if idealism is true, `There is a table in at least one unoccupied room' is true in Berkeley or Mill's mouth, but false in Locke's.
 See, e.g., Barry Taylor, `On Natural Properties in Metaphysics', Mind, 102 (1993), pp. 81-100, esp. [[section]]IV. However, late in the paper, Taylor writes as if he were only insisting that our classifications always concern, to one extent or another, how things relate to us, as if he were simply denying the possibility of the Archimedean point (see the reference to realism `as celebrated in Sydney' on p. 99), and that is a separate issue. Even traditional idealists hold that our classifications reflect to at least some degree the nature of the things we are classifying; their quarrel with realists is over what that nature is.
 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2nd ed. 1991, p. 238.
 Let's agree to set liar sentences and similar hard cases aside.
 It may not be contingent and a posteriori how, say, `The bus leaves at six' represents things as being in English, for it may be that we individuate languages in part by their representational properties. What is then contingent and a posteriori is that we, or anyone, speaks English.
 See, e.g., Ernest Adams, The Logic of Conditionals, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975.
 There is, as has been widely noted, a normative element in the language of semantics and of psychology; therefore, if ethical language is special in not being representational, the normativity of the ethical must be special.
 And desire, see, e.g., Donald Davidson, `Representation and Interpretation', in Modelling the Mind, K. A. Mohyeldin Said et al., eds, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 16.
 In Huw Price, `Psychology in Perspective' in Michaelis Michael and John O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds, Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994, pp. 83-98, there is a good deal on Ryle.
 And, of course, Price notes at the end of his paper that how to individuate frameworks is a matter he needs to address.
 Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, and Ned Block, `Psychologism and Behaviorism', Philosophical Review, 90, 1981, pp. 5-43.
 Paul M. Churchland, `Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1981), pp. 67-90.
 David Lewis, `How to Define Theoretical Terms', The Journal of Philosophy , 67 (1970) pp. 427-46.