


What Global Expressivism might be

(Steve Barker Nottingham)

A: Cognitivist Expressivism

Expressivism: A domain D of discourse is expressive just in case an account of what speakers do in asserting sentences in D does not view speakers as being directed towards relations of representation between mental states and reality but rather views speakers as expressing—in some sense of *expression* to be made clear—states of mind, Π , that are not belief states, truth apt with a certain direction of fit, but non-doxastic, non-representational or non-truth-apt states.

Figure 1



(For an atomic sentence T is F): Canonical State $\Rightarrow \phi-(T) + \gamma-[F]$

Figure 2




Figure 3


$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \Gamma_3 \\ \Gamma_4 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \left. \begin{array}{l} \Gamma_1 \\ \Gamma_2 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \Phi$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \Gamma_5 \\ \Gamma_6 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow$$

Basic-Assertion: Production of S caused by Φ and the disposition to produce (if prompted) symbols X caused by correlated elements Γ_x in the C-law tree for Φ , and by the disposition to produce (if prompted) symbols Y caused by correlated elements Γ_y in the C-law tree for Γ_x , and by the disposition to produce (if prompted) symbols Z caused by correlated elements Γ_z in the C-law tree for Γ_y , and so on.

Belief-state (simple thesis): disposition to defend a Π -state.

B: Representationalist Challenge



Expressivism about Meaning and Mirror Neurons:

The L-processing system: produces speech-act recipes for symbols as outputs for language input: System works on pattern recognition: word-word; word-world, word-belief-attribution, etc.

Thesis 1: What determines the fact that A and B both mean dog by their terms *dog*? No fact.

Thesis 2: The outputs of the L-processing system in any third party C, interpreting A and B, is constrained, causally by underlying causal facts of A and B's (language-cognitive) systems.

C: Realist Expressivism:

Global expressivism is realist, but has the implication the real lacks any metaphysical nature.

(i) In explaining what goes on in producing value-sentences, the referents of *good*, etc—values—or things in terms of which they can be defined, have no explanatory role. The explanation is purely in terms of expression of affective states.

(ii) If values, or anything defining them, play no role in how we explain talk about values, then, any hypotheses, about what values are constituted by are void: all hypotheses are false.

That is because:

Linkage Principle: If we say Os are things with constitution C, there must be some place for Cs to play a role in the analysis of the production of talk about Os.

Values (and meanings) are real but lack any constitutive essence, any identity-maker, any inherent nature.