

# Pluralism, Truth and Use

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# Competing Substantial Theories of Truth: Non-Epistemic

- **Indirect-Causal (IC):** The belief that  $a$  is  $F$  is true if and only if the object causally mapped by  $\langle a \rangle$  has the property causally mapped by  $\langle F \rangle$ .
- Scope/Placement problems

# Competing Substantial Theories of Truth: Epistemic

- **Direct Epistemic (DE)** The belief that  $p$  is true if and only if it is warranted without defeat at some stage of inquiry and would remain so at every successive stage of inquiry.
  - Scope Problems
  - It rained here 1,000,000 years ago

# Competing Substantial Theories of Truth: Pluralistic

|            |            |
|------------|------------|
| Truth (IC) | Truth (DE) |
|------------|------------|

(IC): The belief that a is F is true if and only if the object causally mapped by <a> has the property causally mapped by <F>.

(DE): The belief that p is true if and only if it is warranted without defeat at some stage of inquiry and would remain so at every successive stage of inquiry.

# Two Kinds of Causal Theories

(DC): The belief that p is true if and only if it causally maps the fact that p.

(IC): The belief that a is F is true if and only if the object causally mapped by <a> has the property causally mapped by <F>.

COMP: The belief that a is F is true if and only if the object represented by <a> has the property represented by <F>.

CAUSAL: <sheep> represents sheep = sheep cause, under appropriate conditions, mental tokenings of <sheep>.

# Two Kinds of Epistemic Theories

(DE): The belief that  $p$  is true if and only if it is warranted without defeat at some stage of inquiry and would remain so at every successive stage of inquiry.

(IE): The belief that  $a$  is  $F$  is true if and only if the object epistemically mapped by  $\langle a \rangle$  has the property epistemically mapped by  $\langle F \rangle$ .

COMP: The belief that  $a$  is  $F$  is true if and only if the object represented by  $\langle a \rangle$  has the property represented by  $\langle F \rangle$ .

WARR:  $\langle \text{artwork} \rangle$  represents artworks = Applications of  $\langle \text{artwork} \rangle$  to artworks is warranted without defeat at some stage of inquiry and would remain so at every successive stage of inquiry

|           | Direct | Indirect |
|-----------|--------|----------|
| Causal    | DC     | IC       |
| Epistemic | DE     | IE       |

# Pluralisms about Truth

|            |            |
|------------|------------|
| Truth (DC) | Truth (DE) |
|------------|------------|

# Pluralisms about Truth

Causal




Comp




|            |            |
|------------|------------|
| Truth (IC) | Truth (DE) |
|------------|------------|


# Pluralisms about Truth




# Pluralisms about Truth




# Pluralism about Representation, Monism about Truth



# Pluralism about Representation, Monism about Truth



# Pluralism about Representation, Monism about Truth



(Indirect—Correspondence): The belief that  $a$  is  $F$  is true if and only if the object mapped by  $\langle a \rangle$  has the property mapped by  $\langle F \rangle$ .

# Why prefer a plurality of representations rather than truths?

1. Less Weird
2. Mixed Inferences
3. Complex Sentences

# Complex Sentences

**Sunset 1:** This is a beautiful sunset.

**Sunset 2:** There was a beautiful sunset visible from this spot 1,000,000 years ago.

**Rain 1:** It's raining.

**Rain 2:** It was raining on this spot 1,000,000 years ago.


# Monism about Representation, Monism about Truth

(IE): The belief that a is F is true if and only if the object epistemically mapped by <a> has the property epistemically mapped by <F>.


COMP: The belief that a is F is true if and only if the object represented by <a> has the property represented by <F>.

WARR: <sheep> represents sheep= Applications of <sheep> to sheep is warranted without defeat at some stage of inquiry and would remain so at every successive stage of inquiry

# Monism about Representation, Monism about Truth



# Monism about Representation, Monism about Truth



# Monism about Representation, Monism about Truth


Warr



Comp



Truth




# Monism about Representation, Monism about Truth

Burge, Rawls, Haugeland

↓  
Comp  
↓

Truth

# Epistemic Foundational Semantics




# The Bifurcation Thesis


In philosophically interesting cases, such as the ones thought to give rise to placement problems, pragmatists will be looking for answers that explain the distinctive character of the topics in question – that account for the distinctive character of the evaluative, for example. Their aim is to dissolve the apparent puzzle of these cases, by accounting for the linguistic phenomena at the heart of the puzzle. And their guiding intuition is that **if we can explain how natural creatures in our circumstances naturally come to speak in these ways, there is no further puzzle about the place of the topics concerned**, in the kind of world described by science.

- Macarthur and Price, “Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism and the Global Challenge”, p. 95.

# The Bifurcation Thesis



# The Bifurcation Thesis




Error Theories

# The Bifurcation Thesis

Confused Concepts

$P(\text{con})$

$P(\text{ext})$



Semantic Pessimism

# From Truth Aspiring to Truth Apt

Ontological bifurcation thesis leaves the representational status of our discourse out of our hands, not so with the epistemic.

1. I know I have a hand
2. I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat.
3. If I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat, then I don't know that I have a hand.

# Conclusions

1. Pluralism about truth seems less appealing if you also like indirect accounts of it.
  2. Global epistemic accounts seem more appealing as an indirect than as a direct theory.
  3. The bifurcation thesis survives functions on such an account more as a problem to fix than as a fact to deal with.
- Thank you