Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds -- Notes

Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds

Notes

What is naturalism? For the moment I take it to be the view that the project of metaphysics can properly be conducted from the standpoint of natural science. One reason for not being more specific is that the issue depends on the main project of this paper, which is to show that there is recognisably naturalistic program in metaphysics which is largely ignored by contemporary `naturalists'.
There are important arguments for nonnaturalist views, of course, among them those of Frank Jackson (1982) concerning the status of qualia. As I think Jackson would be the first to acknowledge, however, these arguments do not remove the element of mystery in nonnaturalism.
So long as the functions concerned can be characterised in naturalistically acceptable terms, of course. It isn't obvious that orthodox noncognitivism passes this test. If the functions concerned are characterised in intentional terms, and intentionality itself is naturalistically suspect, noncognitivists may well have a problem.
In the case of meaning it is not clear that noncognitivism is even coherent, for reason mentioned in the previous footnote; cf. Boghossian (1990).
Jackson, Oppy and Smith (1994) answer `no' to this question, arguing that one might be a minimalist about truth but not about truth-aptness, or the belief/non-belief distinction. This is quite true, but no help in defending noncognitivism against some of the more thoroughgoing forms of contemporary minimalism, which do extend to these notions; see O'Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996).
There is a clear statement of this argument in Wright (1992), ch. 1.
In extreme cases the recognised categories might even be held to be empty, as in the view of the atheist, who accepts the conceptual framework of theism, but argues from within it that, in fact, there are no deities. Contrast this with the view of the person who regards the entire framework as meaningless or pragmatically irrelevant. Both views seem legitimate in Carnap's terms, but they shouldn't be confused.
True, the noncognitivist might say that the Carnap thesis applies only to cognitive uses of language, and that the cognitive character of moral discourse is precisely what noncognitivism denies. But the point is that this denial seems implausible, if a moral ontology is so close at hand.
In O'Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996), John O'Leary-Hawthorne and I use this term, but refer to the view as a version of noncognitivism. There is no significant inconsistency with my present terminology, however. O'Leary-Hawthorne and I note that while the view in question is not standard noncognitivism, it is a product of the same intuition about the functions of language, and hence that a terminological decision must be made as to whether to call it a noncognitivist view. Here, in order to highlight the contrast with orthodox noncognitivism, I am using a different label. In Price (1992) I called the same view `vertical pluralism', to distinguish it from the (`horizontal') kind of pluralism which merely allows a plurality of theories within a given area of discourse--a plurality of theories of electromagnetism, for example.
Subject to the earlier caution--see fn. 3.
Obviously a functional pluralist will have to allow frameworks, or linguistic functions, to `mix' in this way. The task of making sense of this seems considerably less severe than that facing noncognitivists, however, who are required to account for the same mixed examples in the standard semantic terms.
This idea was already firmly established when Carnap was writing, of course. Carnap himself refers to the `non-cognitive character' of the external issue as to the acceptability of frameworks.
The difference may be a matter of degree, of course.
The test here is replaceability: the function served by the ball of string could be served by many objects with none of the core properties of string. The use of a screwdriver as a lever provides another example.
Price (1988). For a related account of assertion which might also be used for these purposes, see Brandom (1983, 1994).
At least, it avoids this kind of circularity if notions such as conflict between mental states can be explicated in sufficiently basic terms, so that they don't themselves depend on notions such as truth and falsity. I address this kind of concern in Price (1988), ch. 7.
I think it is important not to confuse the pseudo-externality provided by what Quine calls `semantic ascent' with the genuine externality with which Carnap is concerned. Semantic ascent is available to us from within a linguistic framework: it allows us to pose what are really internal questions by talking about the framework itself. Instead of asking `Is there a prime number greater than 100' we can ask `Is the sentence "There is a prime number greater than 100" true?' Questions of this kind are only sensible if the sentences in question retain their interpretation: otherwise, it would be like asking `Is the sentence "!@#$%^&*" true?' Carnap's external standpoint must be more remote: the issue as to whether to adopt a framework is like the issue as to whether to interpret in the first place.
For an insightful discussion of related objections to the causal/explanatory criterion of reality, see Rosen (1994), pp. 309-313.
There is a clear exposition of the program in Jackson (1994). It is also a major theme of Jackson's 1995 John Locke Lectures.
Here, as elsewhere in this paper, nothing is meant to rest on the physical/natural distinction.
Perhaps there are three lines of argument, the third being the kind of appeal to a physicalist view of causation mentioned at the end of the previous section. If this appeal were invoked in the present case, on the basis that Street speakers take coolness to be a causally efficacious property, I think the pluralist's response should be to ask whether the function of causal talk in Street usage provides support for the thesis that all causation is physical causation.
I am grateful to Chris Daly, Max Kölbel, Michaelis Michael, John O'Leary-Hawthorne, Graham Oppy, Nick Smith, Daniel Stoljar and Ed Zalta for many helpful comments on earlier versions.