

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

HUW PRICE

Q1

Abstract

In this piece I characterise global expressivism, as I understand it, by contrasting it with five other views: the so-called Canberra Plan; Moorean non-naturalism and platonism; ‘relaxed realism’ and quietism; local expressivism; and response-dependent realism. Some other familiar positions, including fictionalism, error theories, and idealism, are also mentioned, but as sub-cases to one of these five.

What is ‘global expressivism’ (GE)? In this piece I’ll explain what I mean by the term by contrasting GE (as I understand it) with a range of other views – more familiar views, to many readers, in most cases. In other words, I want to explain what GE *is* by saying what it *is not*. This indirect approach has some notable neo-pragmatist champions. Recall Dummett’s suggestion that ‘we know the meaning of a sentence when we know how to recognize that it has been falsified’,¹ and the line from Lear that Wittgenstein is said to have had in mind as an epigraph for the *Investigations*: ‘I’ll teach you differences’.

More precisely, I propose to ‘pentangulate’ on GE by saying how it differs from five other positions in the contemporary philosophical landscape. These five views are: (i) the so-called ‘Canberra Plan’; (ii) Moorean non-naturalism and platonism; (iii) ‘relaxed realism’ and quietism; (iv) local expressivism; and (v) response-dependent realism. Imagine that GE sits in the interior of a pentagon, and that I am describing five possible exit routes from this central and (in my view) privileged location. (Some other familiar positions, including fictionalism, error theories, and idealism, will also be mentioned, but won’t merit an exit all of their own, in my map of the territory.)

Before we begin, an important note on terminology. The term ‘expressivism’ is often introduced via the proposal that the function of certain claims (or apparent claims) is (i) not to *describe* some aspect of the world but rather (ii) to *express* a psychological state

¹ Michael Dummett, ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)’, in Gareth Evans and John McDowell, eds., *Truth and Meaning* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 67–137, at 83.

(other than a belief) – an affective state, say. (Think of old-fashioned emotivism, for example.) Things then get confusing when we encounter a case in which we want to say (i) but not (ii). Some views of truth hold that claims of the form ‘P is true’ are not ascriptions of some distinctive kind of property, but rather have some other function – perhaps saying what P itself says, but in a usefully different way (one that permits generalisation, say, as in ‘Everything Mary says is true’).

Should we use ‘expressivism’ for these latter views, too, because they share (i); or choose some other term (perhaps ‘pragmatism’), restricting expressivism to the case in which we also have (ii)? This is simply a terminological choice, and the important thing is to recognise that it needs to be made. Claims (i) and (ii) don’t necessarily go together, and there isn’t an unambiguous ready-made term that allows for that possibility. As just noted, ‘pragmatism’ is an option (one I have used myself in some contexts²), but it has its own ambiguities.

At any rate, I stress that what I here call global expressivism is expressivism in the broad sense (so that (ii) is inessential). This seems to me a very natural usage, especially when one has been interested, as I have, in the convergence between rather different uses of the term ‘expressivism’ in the modern Humean tradition associated with writers such as Simon Blackburn, and in what one might call the Hegelian tradition associated with Robert Brandom.³ To avoid confusion, however, it is important to realise both that some contemporary writers use ‘expressivism’ in the narrow sense that requires (ii);⁴ and that some writers are coming to use ‘neo-pragmatism’ for what I call expressivism.⁵

² See, e.g., David Macarthur and Huw Price, ‘Pragmatism, Quasi-realism and the Global Challenge’, in Cheryl Misak, ed., *The New Pragmatists* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 91–120.

³ See Huw Price, ‘Expressivism for Two Voices’, in J. Knowles and H. Rydenfelt, eds., *Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism* (Zürich: Peter Lang, 2011), 87–113.

⁴ For example, Mark Schroeder, *Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁵ For example, Joshua Gert, ‘Neo-pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 97 (2018), 454–478.

1. The Canberra Plan

87 Now to the first of our differences. The Canberra Plan⁶ (CP) begins
88 with *location* or *placement* problems: Where do normativity, meaning,
89 mentality, and other puzzling domains ‘fit’ in the kind of world
90 described by science? Canberra Planners propose to answer questions
91 of this kind with a generalisations of the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis
92 approach to the meaning of theoretical terms (or the nature of
93 theoretical entities, to put it in material mode).
94

95
96 The proposed solution comes in two steps. At Step 1 we collect the
97 core truths or platitudes about the target entity or property – the
98 core or property Target, let us say – and conjoin them to form
99 the Ramsey sentence, R(Target). At Step 2 we ask in the world
100 *satisfies* or *makes true* the sentence R(Target) – or to what the term
101 ‘Target’ *refers*. As Haukioja puts it, Step 1 is a matter of ‘*a priori*
102 analysis of our philosophically interesting everyday concepts and
103 folk theories’; Step 2 of ‘consult[ing] the best scientific (typically,
104 physical) theories to see whether ... referents [for the terms so
105 analysed] are to be found in reality’.⁷ Typically, as here, this is under-
106 stood to mean *natural* reality, the world described by natural science,
107 but this isn’t essential to the method. A non-naturalist could also
108 frame her investigations in these terms.

109 *Accepting Step 1.* How does GE differ? So far as I can see, it need
110 have no distinctive objection to Step 1. Other objections may be
111 raised to Step 1 – for example, that it pays insufficient attention
112 either to the analytic–synthetic distinction, or to the grey zone that
113 results from taking seriously Quinean objections to such a distinction.
114 But if anything such objections are likely to trouble GE less than they
115 do Canberra Planners, I think, because they threaten Step 2, which is
116 where GE and CP really differ.

117 *Trivialising Step 2.* GE simply denies that Step 2 leads to non-
118 trivial results, in general. Clearly, Target satisfies R(Target), if any-
119 thing does. But expecting a non-trivial alternative, *in general*, relies on
120 a non-deflationary reading of the semantic terms such as *satisfies*,
121 *makes true*, or *refers* – a reading that GE rejects.
122

123
124 ⁶ See Frank Jackson, *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of*
125 *Conceptual Analysis*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), and the essays in
126 David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, eds., *Conceptual Analysis and*
127 *Philosophical Naturalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009).

128 ⁷ J. Haukioja, Review of David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola
129 (eds.), *Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism*, MIT Press,
2009. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 14.08.2009.

Huw Price

130 Elsewhere I have explained this point in terms of Quine’s notion of
131 ‘semantic ascent’. Quine insists that the move from ‘Snow is white’ to
132 “‘Snow is white’ is true’ doesn’t change the subject – either way,
133 we’re just talking about snow. In the latter case it looks as though
134 we are talking about language, but really we are just talking about
135 the material world, just as before. Similarly, as I put it,

[a]sking “What makes it true that snow is white?”, or “What
136 makes ‘Snow is white’ true?”, is just another way of asking
137 what makes snow white – a reasonable question, in this case,
138 but a question to be answered in terms of the physics of ice and
139 light, not in terms of the metaphysics of facts and states of
140 affairs. There is no additional *semantic* explanandum, and no dis-
141 tinctively metaphysical question.⁸
142
143

144 Similarly, if you are a competent English speaker, familiar with the
145 use of the term, then the question “To what does “snow” refer?” can
146 be construed as an awkward way of asking ‘What is this stuff,
147 snow?’ That’s a reasonable question, in this case, but one for
148 natural science. There’s no reason to suppose either that it remains
149 a reasonable question in other domains, or that the talk of reference
150 and the like played any substantial role in framing it.

151 As I note in the same context, Blackburn makes a similar point:

152 Blackburn notes that on Ramsey’s view, the move from ‘P’ to ‘It
153 is true that P’ – “Ramsey’s ladder”, as he calls it – doesn’t take us
154 to a new theoretical level. He remarks that there are “philosophies
155 that take advantage of the horizontal nature of Ramsey’s ladder to
156 climb it, and then announce a better view from the top.”⁹
157

158 I take it that CP is one of the philosophies that Blackburn has in mind
159 here. GE agrees with Blackburn, arguing that talk of truthmakers,
160 denotations, and the like adds nothing to the repertoire of metaphy-
161 sics, unless the semantic notions in question are more robust than
162 those of Ramsey, Wittgenstein and Quine – and rejecting such a
163 view of semantics. If a proponent of CP tries to embrace this
164 conclusion, saying that their own use of semantic notions is similarly
165 ‘thin’ – that in effect, Step 2 simply asks ‘What is the X such that
166 R(X)?’ – then GE says again that we already have a trivial answer to
167 that question, but no reason in general to expect a non-trivial one.
168

169 ⁸ Huw Price, *Naturalism Without Mirrors* (Oxford: Oxford University
170 Press, 2011), at 14.

171 ⁹ Huw Price, op cit, 15; Simon Blackburn, *Ruling Passions: A Theory of*
172 *Practical Reasoning* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 78.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

173 Once again, the qualification about generality is important. GE
174 may have no need to challenge particular cases, including those of
175 theoretical identification in science. But it will argue that in these
176 cases the semantic characterisation is inessential – the questions can
177 be phrased without it. Some proponents of CP might agree, and
178 argue that the science model is all we need – CP should be simply
179 be seen as generalised functionalism. On this view, R(Target)
180 encodes the causal and functional role of Target, and Step 2 simply
181 enjoins us to look for whatever it is that plays this causal role – a ques-
182 tion for natural science, in principle. However, as Peter Menzies and I
183 have pointed out, this version of CP doesn't have the generality to
184 which CP aspires – it cannot handle the investigation of the causal rela-
185 tion itself, for example.¹⁰

186 *GE is not just Step 1.* Thus GE rejects (any non-trivial reading of)
187 Step 2, in general. But it would be a mistake to characterise GE by
188 saying that it simply amounts to Step 1 of CP without Step 2. This
189 would be to ignore what GE takes to be the most interesting question,
190 or group of questions: viz., questions about the *function* of the term
191 'Target'. What are the use-rules for the term? And what is it 'for' –
192 what difference does its possession make, to creatures like us? As
193 Michael Williams points out, both these questions can be seen as
194 asking about the function of a term, but in different senses of 'func-
195 tion'. The first asks a descriptive question about 'how it works', or
196 functions in that sense; the second a potentially explanatory question
197 about the role the term or concept plays in our lives – its function in a
198 sense closer to the claim that the function of thirst is to make us drink
199 when our body needs fluids.¹¹

200 Of course, views other than GE may ask these questions, too. What
201 is distinctive about GE is that it eschews semantic notions in answer-
202 ing them. Thus GE asks a question about the function of the term
203 'Target', and expects an answer which doesn't rest substantially on
204 semantic notions (though see Section 4.3 below).

205
206
207
208 ¹⁰ Peter Menzies and Huw Price, 'Is Semantics in the Plan?', in
209 D. Braddon-Mitchell and R. Nola, op. cit. note 2; Huw Price, 'The
210 Semantic Foundations of Metaphysics', in Ian Ravenscroft, ed., *Minds,*
211 *Worlds and Conditionals: Essays in Honour of Frank Jackson* (Oxford:
212 Oxford University Press, 2009), 111–140.

213 ¹¹ Michael Williams, 'How Pragmatists Can Be Local Expressivists', in
214 Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich, and
215 Michael Williams, *Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism*
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 128–144.

216 *Deflationism about truth conditions.* It is important to note that
217 eschewing semantic notions does not commit GE to *denying* that
218 the language in question ‘has truth conditions’, and the like. On the
219 contrary, GE claims, it is a more or less trivial matter that moral
220 language (say) does have truth conditions, in the only sense GE
221 takes to be available – viz., the deflationary sense. ‘Cruelty is
222 wrong’ is true if and only if cruelty is wrong. Here is Blackburn
223 making this sort of point about his own version of expressivism:

224 *Q. 18.* Aren’t you really trying to defend our right to talk ‘as if
225 there were moral truths, although in your view, *there aren’t any*
226 *really?*
227

228 *Ans.* No, no no. I do not say that we can talk as if kicking dogs
229 were wrong, when ‘really’ it isn’t wrong. I say that it is wrong
230 (so that it is true that it is wrong, so it is really true that it is
231 wrong, so this is an example of a moral truth, so there are
232 moral truths).

233 This misinterpretation is curiously common. Anyone advancing
234 it must believe themselves to have some more robust, metaphys-
235 ically heavyweight conception of what it would be for there to be
236 moral truths REALLY, and compared with this genuine article,
237 I only have us talking *as if* there are moral truths REALLY.
238 I deny that there is any such coherent conception.¹²
239

240 In this respect, like Blackburn’s view, GE differs from some of its
241 early non-cognitivist ancestors. They were inclined to regard the
242 claim that moral statements have truth conditions as *false*, rather
243 than *trivially true*. It is deflationism that recommends this shift, of
244 course. But far from making things problematic for the *ur*-insight
245 of non-cognitivism – namely, that moral language is in a different
246 line of work than standardly assumed – it actually supports it, in a
247 dramatic fashion. If truth is sufficiently ‘thin’, then for no kinds of
248 claims at all do we do any interesting work by saying that they have
249 the function of ‘stating truths’, or anything of that sort. (More on
250 this in Section 4.1.)

251 *GE, CP and naturalism.* As noted, CP typically assumes natural-
252 ism. The placement problem is find a place for morality, or
253 meaning, *in the natural world*. GE rejects naturalism (of this sort),
254 though it puts the point in ‘meta-linguistic’ rather than metaphysical
255 vocabulary – i.e., by saying not that moral properties are not natural
256

257 ¹² Simon Blackburn, *Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning*
258 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 319.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

259 properties, but that moral vocabulary is in a different ‘line of work’
260 from the language of science. (It might be better to say that GE
261 rejects the question about naturalism, as CP conceives it; rather
262 than accepting the question and offering a different answer. Both
263 sides think of the question ‘Are moral properties natural properties?’
264 as a kind of taxonomic question – Should this go in that box? – but
265 they have very different views of what needs classifying. For GE it
266 is uses of language.)

267 *Subject naturalism.* Finally, it is important to note that GE may
268 retain naturalism in a different sense – what I have called *subject nat-*
269 *uralism*, as opposed to the *object naturalism* of CP.¹³ Subject natural-
270 ism is naturalism in the sense of Hume. It takes for granted that we
271 humans are natural creatures, and that language is at base a natural be-
272 haviour. It seeks an understanding of the origins and functions of
273 particular discourses on that basis.

2. Non-Naturalism and Platonism

274
275
276
277
278 Turning in a different direction, it is clear that in declining to
279 embrace (object) naturalism, GE has something in common with
280 various forms of non-naturalist realism and platonism, such as a
281 Moorean view about morality (Moore, 1903), or platonism about
282 meaning, mathematical objects, or abstract entities. How does GE
283 differ from such a view? In two main ways.

284 *Meta-linguistics, not metaphysics.* First, the non-naturalism of GE
285 is expressed, as noted above, in meta-linguistic rather than metaphys-
286 ical mode. GE does not find it philosophically illuminating to say that
287 the world contains moral properties, as well as natural properties. It
288 may agree that moral properties are not natural properties, but this
289 comes with a crucial clarification: this is to be understood as a loose
290 way of expressing something that we put more clearly by shifting ex-
291 plicitly to the meta-linguistic frame, and saying that moral terms and
292 concepts are in a different ‘line of work’ to the terms and concepts of
293 natural science.

294 *A non-representationalist account of meaning.* What does it mean to
295 be in a ‘line of work’? In explaining this we point to the second dif-
296 ference between GE and typical non-naturalist realist and platonist
297 views. As we saw above, GE embraces a non-representationalist
298

299 ¹³ Huw Price, ‘Naturalism without Representationalism’, in David
300 Macarthur and Mario de Caro, eds., *Naturalism in Question* (Cambridge,
301 Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 71–88.

302 functional account of what we do with such terms and concepts.
303 Orthodox non-naturalists and platonists are typically orthodox,
304 among other things, in their representationalism. They take for
305 granted that the function of moral terms is usefully characterised as
306 that of ‘referring to moral properties’ (or something similar, ex-
307 pressed in related semantic terms). Once again, GE does not deny
308 such claims, but regards them in the Quinean spirit as empty of sub-
309 stantial theoretical content. The substantial work takes place else-
310 where, according to GE, in a subject naturalist functional
311 genealogy of moral properties.

312 313 314 *2.1 Non-naturalism below the bar – fictionalism and error Theories*

315
316 With this contrast between GE and non-naturalist *realism* in mind,
317 we can treat as a subcase the contrast with non-naturalist *irrealism*.
318 Non-naturalist irrealists agree with their realist cousins that moral
319 terms are usefully characterised representationally: they are the
320 kind of terms that ‘claim to’ refer to properties in the world. Where
321 they differ from realists is in maintaining that such terms systematic-
322 ally fail to achieve such reference, for there are no such properties.
323 Either our moral claims are flatly in error, or, at best, have the
324 status of useful fictions.

325 GE differs from such views in two closely related ways. As before,
326 it rejects the representationalist characterisation of the vocabularies in
327 question, except in the trivial deflationary sense. And, in a move that
328 has the effect of extending the same deflationary spirit to the meta-
329 physical side of the ledger, it denies any sense to the irrealist’s nega-
330 tive claims. This point was well made by Blackburn in early work,
331 defending his own ‘quasi-realist’ position. (As we shall see, GE
332 differs only in wanting to eliminate the qualification ‘quasi’.) As
333 Blackburn puts it:¹⁴

334
335 What then is the mistake of describing such a philosophy [quasi-
336 realism] as holding that ‘we talk as if there are necessities when
337 really there are none’? It is the failure to notice that the quasi-
338 realist need allow no sense to what follows the ‘as if’ except one
339 in which it is true. And conversely he need allow no sense to
340 the contrasting proposition in which it in turn is true.

341
342
343 ¹⁴ Simon Blackburn, ‘Morals and Modals’, in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*
344 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 52–74, at 57.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

345 Blackburn continues:

346 Quasi-realism no more need allow such sense than (say) one
347 holding Locke's theory of colour need accept the view that we
348 talk as if there are colours, when there are actually none. This
349 is doubly incorrect, because nothing in the Lockean view
350 forces us to allow any sense to 'there are colours' except one in
351 which it is true; conversely neither need it permit a sense to
352 'there are actually none' in which that is true.
353

354 My late Sydney colleague David Armstrong used to complain that
355 the problem with Wittgensteinians is that they won't allow you to
356 say what you want to say. Armstrong was right about
357 Wittgensteinians, I think (if in my view wrong about it being a
358 problem, at least in general), and Blackburn's point here is an
359 example of it. This may be one of those Wittgensteinian things for
360 which Ramsey deserves some of the credit. The point has much in
361 common with Ramsey's own famous dig at the (early)
362 Wittgenstein's view: 'What we can't say we can't say, and we can't
363 whistle it either.'¹⁵
364
365

366 3. Relaxed Realism and Quietism

367
368 Our next contrast is with a different cluster of non-naturalist views,
369 for which I'll borrow Sarah McGrath's excellent term 'relaxed
370 realism'. McGrath uses this label to characterise some recent posi-
371 tions in normative ethics. As she puts it 'relaxed realist themes are
372 central to Dworkin's *Justice for Hedgehogs* (2011), Parfit's *On What*
373 *Matters* (2011), and Scanlon's *Being Realistic about Reasons*
374 (2014)'.¹⁶ She says:

375 I ... call this picture relaxed realism ... to capture the way in
376 which its proponents combine a commitment to realism with a
377

378
379 ¹⁵ F. P. Ramsey, 'General Propositions and Causality', in D. H. Mellor,
380 ed., *Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics*
381 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 133–51, at 134.

382 ¹⁶ Sarah McGrath, 'Relax? Don't Do It! Why Moral Realism Won't
383 Come Cheap', *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 9 (2014), 186–214, at 187.
384 The works cited are Ronald Dworkin, *Justice for Hedgehogs* (Cambridge,
385 Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011); Derek Parfit, *On What Matters*,
386 *Volume 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Thomas Scanlon,
387 *Being Realistic About Reasons* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014).

Huw Price

388 certain lack of anxiety about the status and standing of morality,
389 despite understanding morality in ways that might naturally
390 encourage such anxiety.¹⁷

391 We can find similar views under other names, both in the normative
392 case and in others. I'm thinking of McDowell's 're-enchanted natural-
393 ism'; of 'minimal realism', as used by many writers; of John
394 Campbell's 'simple realism' about colour; of 'liberal naturalism', as
395 used by writers such as Macarthur and de Caro; and of the kind of
396 'neo-Fregean platonism' associated with Bob Hale and Crispin
397 Wright.¹⁸

398 This is a large basket, and by no means homogeneous, but I hope it
399 is clear that there are common themes – particularly, the rejection of a
400 certain sort of metaphysical stance, the one that encourages anxiety,
401 as McGrath puts it. A catch-all term for this rejection might be 'meta-
402 physical quietism'? Often attributed to Wittgenstein, this kind of
403 quietism is characterised by McDowell as the rejection of a sideways
404 metaphysical perspective on our practices.

405 *Metaphysical quietism, yes; explanatory quietism, no.* GE agrees
406 with these views about the attractions of *metaphysical* quietism – of
407 a deflationary approach to metaphysical issues. Where it disagrees,
408 if at all, is in insisting on the interest and respectability of another
409 project – the functional and genealogical project. Concerning
410 McDowell, for example, my own strategy¹⁹ has been to present him
411 with a dilemma. Either he has to be more quietist than even he
412 wants to be, in being unable to explain the sense in which (in his
413 words), '[v]alues are not brutally there—not there independently of
414 our sensibility—any more than colours are'.²⁰ Or he has to endorse

416 ¹⁷ Op. cit., 187.

417 ¹⁸ See John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
418 University Press, 1994); John Campbell, 'A simple view of colour', in
419 J. Haldane and C. Wright, eds., *Reality: Representation and Projection*.
420 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 257–268; Mario De Caro and
421 David Macarthur, eds., *Naturalism and Normativity* (New York:
422 Columbia University Press, 2010); and Bob Hale and Crispin Wright,
423 *The Reason's Proper Study : Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of*
424 *Mathematics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

425 ¹⁹ See Huw Price, 'Idling and Sidling toward Philosophical Peace', in
426 Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, eds., *Meaning*
427 *without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and*
428 *Naturalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 307–330.

429 ²⁰ John McDowell, 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in *Mind, Value,*
430 *and Reality* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 131–50,
at 146.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

431 what is in effect an expressivist genealogy – a ‘sideways’ explanation
432 of how our value and colour judgements come to depend on
433 aspects of our sensibility (different aspects, in each case).

434 Stepping back a little, we could say that relaxed realists face a trim-
435 lemma. Faced with what seem to be legitimate questions about partic-
436 ular discourses – why we have them, how they differ, how they
437 relate to our sensibilities – there are three main options. In the meta-
438 physical corner are views that appeal to the nature of the properties or
439 entities in question (e.g., again, colours and values) to answer such
440 questions. In the extreme quietist corner are views that simply fail
441 to engage with such questions. And in the third corner is expressi-
442 vism. The first corner seems off limits for anything worth calling
443 relaxed realism – but that leaves a choice between what is arguably
444 an excessive quietism, and expressivism itself.²¹

445 Of course, it is entirely possible that a relaxed realist might choose
446 different corners in different cases. In particular, they might thereby
447 end up endorsing our next complement to GE itself.

4. Local Expressivism

450 Local expressivism (LE) agrees with GE *locally* in response to the
451 previous folk, in stressing the importance of pragmatist genealogy
452 (for normative discourse, say). But it disagrees in wanting to maintain
453 a *bifurcation* between cases in which this pragmatist stance is appropri-
454 ate and cases in which it is not. A classic statement of this commit-
455 ment is that of Robert Kraut:

458 The bifurcationist often undertakes the task of determining
459 which of our well-formed declarative sentences have truth
460 conditions and which ones, though meaningful, are simply the
461 manifestations of attitudes or the expressions of ‘stances’. He
462 wants to know which of our predicates get at real properties in
463 the world, and which, in contrast, merely manifest aspects of
464 our representational apparatus—‘projections borrowed from our
465 internal sentiments’. On different occasions he articulates his
466 task in different ways; but they all point to some variant of the *bi-*
467 *furcation thesis* ..., the thesis that some declarative sentences ...

471 ²¹ For related criticism of relaxed realism, see Michael Ridge,
472 ‘Relaxing Realism or Deferring Debate?’, *Journal of Philosophy* 116
473 (2019), 149–173.

Huw Price

- 474 — describe the world
- 475 — ascribe real properties
- 476 — are genuinely representational
- 477 — are about ‘what’s really out there’
- 478 — have determinate truth conditions
- 479 — express matters of fact
- 480 — limn the true structure of reality

481 whereas other declarative sentences ...

- 483 — express commitments or attitudes
- 484 — manifest a ‘stance’ (praise, condemnation, endorsement, etc.)
- 485 — are expressive rather than descriptive
- 486 — do not ‘picture’ the world
- 487 — lack truth conditions, but possess ‘acceptance conditions’
- 488 — or ‘assertibility conditions’
- 489 — merely enable us to ‘cope’ with reality
- 490 — are true (or false) by convention
- 491 — do not express ‘facts of the matter’.²²

492 As I say, LE wants to maintain some distinction of this kind, and to
493 state its central insight as the idea that *some* interesting discourses –
494 moral or modal discourse, for example – fall on the latter, ‘expressive’,
495 side of it. For such views the question as to how precisely to formulate
496 the bifurcation thesis becomes crucial. Many early LE views tended
497 to do it terms of truth, saying that moral claims lack truth conditions,
498 or something of that kind. However, as Blackburn again deserves
499 much credit for pointing out, such a view is at best incomplete: it
500 leaves us with the question as to why such claims look so much like
501 the claims which do have truth conditions, according to this view.
502 If moral claims don’t have truth conditions, why do we call them
503 true and false, in ordinary conversation? Blackburn’s quasi-realism
504 (QR) can be thought of as an attempt to answer this important ques-
505 tion, and a generalisation of it: If there is a bifurcation, why is it so
506 well hidden in ordinary usage?

507 GE agrees with QR in pressing this kind of question against early
508 versions of LE. Against QR, argues that by QR’s own lights, there is
509 no satisfactory basis for a bifurcation, at least in the broadly semantic
510 territory in which it LE has tried to find it. In semantic terms, QR
511 comes under pressure to extend whatever it says about the semantic
512 features (e.g., the use of ‘true’ and ‘false’) of supposedly expressive
513

514
515 ²² Robert Kraut, ‘Varieties of Pragmatism’, *Mind* 99 (1990), 157–183, at
516 159.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

discourses to *all* discourses, thus eliminating the bifurcation. This is what David Macarthur and I have called the global challenge to QR.²³ For present purposes I'll call it the *semantic* global challenge, so as to distinguish it from a second *pragmatic* global challenge.

4.1 The semantic global challenge

In more detail, the global challenge works from two directions: *pulling from the outside*, and *pushing from the inside*, as Macarthur and I say. Pulling from the outside, the argument appeals to semantic deflationism, or minimalism, observing that such a view threatens to deflate the QR's residual representationalism. Deflationism is often characterised as the view that the notions in question don't do explanatory work.²⁴ But grounding the bifurcation thesis certainly would be explanatory work.

It is important to realise that this is not an old argument that minimalism defeats non-cognitivism, by making it 'easy' to be truth-conditional.²⁵ Macarthur and I meet that argument on LE's behalf by distinguishing what we call the *positive* and *negative* theses in traditional expressivism. The negative thesis is that moral claims (say) do not have truth conditions. The positive thesis is that moral claims have some *non-semantically-characterised function*, e.g., that of expressing affective attitudes.

Deflationism does undermine the negative thesis, but doesn't challenge the positive thesis – on the contrary, it suggests that the positive thesis has to be a model for everything, in the sense that it implies that for *no vocabulary at all* can it be informative to say that it has a semantically-characterised function – deflationism denies us such a

²³ David Macarthur and Huw Price, 'Pragmatism, Quasi-realism and the Global Challenge', in Cheryl Misak, ed., *The New Pragmatists* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 91–120.

²⁴ See, for example, John O'Leary-Hawthorne and Huw Price, 'How to Stand Up for Non-cognitivists', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74 (1996), 275–292.

²⁵ Versions of that argument may be found in John McDowell, 'Anti-realism and the Epistemology of Understanding', in J. Bouveresse and H. Parret, eds, *Meaning and Understanding* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981), 225–248; Paul Boghossian, 'The Status of Content', *Philosophical Review* 99 (1990), 157–184; Crispin Wright, *Truth and Objectivity* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Lloyd Humberstone, 'Critical Notice of F. Jackson, *Conditionals*', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 51 (1991), 227–234.

560 theoretical role for semantic notions. Deflationism is thus a friend not
561 an enemy of expressivism, and militates strongly in favour of the
562 global version. We take Blackburn's version of QR to be vulnerable
563 to this argument because Blackburn is (usually – forgetting occa-
564 sional lapses into 'success semantics') a card-carrying deflationist.

565 So much for pulling from the outside. By pushing from the inside,
566 Macarthur and I mean the argument that QR threatens to be too suc-
567 cessful for its own good, so long as it retains the ambition to be a
568 merely local view. After all, if QR can show why we talk the truth
569 talk without walking the representational walk in hard cases, such as
570 ethics, why not in easy cases, too? For example, if the explanation of
571 truth talk in the case of ethical language is that it encourages us to
572 align our affective attitudes in a useful way, why not say the same
573 about other mental states, such as the ones QR thinks of a genuine
574 beliefs. Why not think of their truth talk as explained in the same way?²⁶
575

576 577 4.2 *The pragmatic global challenge* 578

579 There is another ingredient to the case for preferring GE to LE, in
580 my view. It rests on the central insights of expressivism, and on the
581 realisation that, once in view, the kind of pragmatic factors important
582 to the formulation of expressivism in familiar 'local' cases can be seen
583 to be universal. No discourse is wholly free of them, and expressivism
584 thus becomes a global view.

585 Briefly, the case goes like this. Expressivism links particular asser-
586 toric 'vocabularies' to particular 'pragmatic grounds' – i.e., to the
587 practical features of speakers on which the use of a particular vocabu-
588 lary depends. In the moral case, for example, the pragmatic grounds
589 are (in the simplest version of the view) the affective attitudes that
590 moral claims are taken to express.²⁷

591 I have appealed to rule-following considerations to argue that prag-
592 matic grounds are universal – no part of language is free of them. If
593

594
595 ²⁶ As I put it in *Facts and the Function of Truth* (Oxford: Basil
596 Blackwell, 1988), the problem isn't in getting the projectivist project (as
597 we then called it) on the road; it is in stopping it anywhere short of a
598 global conclusion.

599 ²⁷ A powerful framework to develop this idea is that of Robert
600 Brandom, *Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism*
601 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). When Brandom asks what one
602 has to be able to *do*, in order to *say* particular things, this is an enquiry
about the pragmatic grounds of a discourse, in my terminology.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

603 nothing else, we always rely on contingent dispositions to generalise in
604 the same way from finite classes of training examples. In *Facts and the*
605 *Function of Truth* I put this in term of what I called ‘no-fault disagree-
606 ment’ (NFD). NFD arises in cases in which two speakers seem to dis-
607 agree, but the apparent difference of opinion turns out to rest on some
608 non-obvious difference in their situation – e.g., in certain cases of
609 probability judgements, which were one of my main examples, on
610 the fact that they have access to different bodies of evidence.

611 I take NFD to be a characteristic symptom of variation in pragmatic
612 ground. To use an example I give elsewhere,²⁸ two speakers might
613 disagree as to whether Canberra is a bustling place. When it turns
614 out that their ‘bustle receptors’ are simply set at different levels –
615 one comes from a rural village, one from a busy city – we are inclined
616 to say that neither has made any mistake. The rule-following consid-
617 erations show that in principle, all uses of language are subject to this
618 kind of possibility. What this reveals is a particular sort of pragmatic
619 ground underlying all language whatsoever. In my view, this provides
620 a further powerful reason for preferring GE to LE.²⁹

4.3 Isn’t a different bifurcation possible?

622
623
624
625 On behalf of LE, it might be objected that GE’s rejection of the
626 bifurcation thesis is too swift. Even from a pragmatist’s perspective,
627 isn’t there something to said for the idea that some of our claims
628 and mental states are more in the business of keeping track of our
629 external environment than others? Analogies with other animals
630 provide one way to develop this objection. Surely they have internal
631 states that function to keep track of their environments, for various
632 purposes. And don’t we do the same thing?

633 This a very helpful objection, and it is useful to think first about
634 what QR should make of it. Even for QR, there’s clearly a dilemma
635 lurking here. If QR tries to put weight on some such notion of
636

637
638 ²⁸ Huw Price, ‘Two Paths to Pragmatism’, in Peter Menzies, ed.,
639 *Response-Dependent Concepts* (Canberra: Philosophy Program, RISSS,
640 ANU), 46–82; updated version reprinted as ‘Two Paths to Pragmatism
641 II’, in R. Casati and C. Tappolet, eds., *European Review of Philosophy* 3
(1998), 109–147.

642 ²⁹ See also the discussion in Huw Price ‘Epilogue: Ramsey’s
643 Ubiquitous Pragmatism’. In Cheryl Misak and Huw Price, eds., *The*
644 *Practical Turn: Pragmatism in the British Long Twentieth Century*
645 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 149–162, at 155–156.

646 environment-tracking, in order to ground a semantic bifurcation
647 thesis, the same internal tensions in the position will be pushed to
648 the foreground: roughly, the more QR says that real truth is to be
649 understood in terms of environment-tracking, the less plausible it
650 will be that QR can offer some satisfactory ‘quasi-truth’ in the
651 cases it wants to treat in expressive terms; while the more plausible
652 QR makes its account of ‘quasi-truth’, the less plausible it will be
653 that any separate account of truth is needed in the (claimed) environ-
654 ment-tracking cases.

655 The solution I have recommended, in the light of these considera-
656 tions, is to be clear that we have two different notions (or clusters of
657 notions) in play. There isn’t a univocal notion that works both in the
658 environment-tracking cases and as an account of the notion of truth in
659 play in language at large. But once we recognise this, and keep these
660 notions distinct, everything goes smoothly. I have put the distinction
661 in terms of two notions of representation: an environment-tracking
662 notion I call *e-representation* and a broader, linguistically-grounded
663 notion I call *i-representation*. As I have noted, this distinction does
664 much the same job as Sellars’ distinction between two notions of
665 truth, notions that ‘belong in different boxes’, as Sellars puts it.³⁰

666 So long as we recognise that the narrower notion (my *e-representa-*
667 *tion*) should itself be regarded as a pragmatic notion, a bifurcation
668 cast in these terms doesn’t in any way undermine the global character
669 of GE. Environment-tracking is one pragmatic function among many
670 others, in effect. The appeal to rule-following should counter any
671 tendency to think that the parts of language that are in the business
672 of environment-tracking are somehow less pragmatically-grounded
673 than other parts of language. On the contrary, the rule-following
674 point shows that there’s at least one pragmatic element that underpins
675 them all.³¹

676
677 ³⁰ See my ‘Prospects for Global Expressivism’, in Huw Price, Simon
678 Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich, and Michael Williams,
679 *Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism* (Cambridge:
680 Cambridge University Press, 2013), 147–194, especially Section 5; and
681 Huw Price, ‘Wilfrid Sellars meets Cambridge Pragmatism’, in David
682 Pereplyotchik and Deborah Barnbaum, eds., *Sellars and Contemporary*
683 *Philosophy* (New York and London: Routledge, 2017), 123–140.

684 ³¹ There may be more to be said about whether the response of this
685 section leaves any real disagreement between GE and LE. Matthew
686 Simpson, ‘What is Global Expressivism?’, *Philosophical Quarterly*, forth-
687 coming, argues that it does not. In one sense this conclusion is congenial
688 to me, for I don’t want there to be a coherent alternative to GE in this neigh-
bourhood. But it does seem overly charitable to traditional proponents of

689 **5. Response-Dependent Realism**
690

691 For our last contrast, I turn to a view once widely seen as an attractive
692 alternative to what we are here calling expressivism, an approach I
693 shall call response-dependent realism (RDR). Leading early versions
694 of this view included those of Mark Johnston and Crispin Wright.³²
695 RDR can be seen as a proposal for defending the ‘factual’, ‘cognitive’
696 or ‘realist’ character of various discourses, by putting pragmatic
697 factors – e.g., desires, in the moral case – into the content. In effect,
698 it proposed to retain factuality (and the like) by reading a discourse
699 as more subject-involving than initially it seems, on the model of
700 the view that colours are dispositions to affect normally-sighted
701 humans in certain ways. Accordingly, as Johnston’s title suggests, it
702 can be seen as a form of pragmatism; but not pragmatism as
703 Humean expressivists know it. A Humean expressivist doesn’t take
704 moral claims to be talking *about* a speaker’s affective reactions, of
705 course – that’s mistake number one in the expressivist’s list of
706 common misinterpretations.

707 By the standards of contemporary expressivism, however, it is hard
708 not to see RDR as a solution to a non-existent problem. As we have
709 seen, contemporary expressivists in the Humean tradition (especially
710 at the GE end of it) don’t deny that moral claims have truth
711 conditions, or reject simple speaking-with-the folk realism about
712 moral properties and the like. On the contrary, they affirm these
713 things, in the minimal sense – that’s where they agree with relaxed
714 realists – while continuing to insist on an expressivist functional
715 genealogy. (The point of QR was to show how this is possible,
716 starting where Hume does.)

717 As we noted above (Section 4.1), semantic minimalism is a friend
718 not an enemy of expressivism of this sort (at least until the dispute
719 between LE and GE comes into play, when it favours GE). And
720 minimal semantics seems to bring minimal content, in the obvious
721 way. The content of the belief that X is good is that X is good.
722

724
725
726 LE, who didn’t have the e-representation/i-representation distinction on
727 which the irenic resolution depends.

728 ³² See their respective contributions to J. Haldane and C. Wright, eds.,
729 *Reality, Representation, and Projection*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford
730 University Press, 1993): Wright’s ‘Realism: The Contemporary Debate—
731 W(h)ither Now?’, 63–84; and Johnston’s ‘Objectivity Refigured:
Pragmatism Without Verificationism’, 85–130.

732 This means that RDR needs some other ‘non-obvious’ notion of
733 content, or truth conditions. And now the dialectic is much as in
734 the fictionalist case, and indeed the Canberra Plan case. GE simply
735 challenges the entitlement to any further fact of the required kind, *ex-*
736 *pressed in semantic vocabulary*. GE is not opposed to further facts in
737 the neighbourhood *tout court*, of course. It simply insists that the
738 right vocabulary in which to express them is one of use conditions,
739 or something similar, not truth or content conditions. As
740 Blackburn himself puts these points, commenting on RDR:

[RDR] goes bullheaded at the issue [of meaning] in terms of
742 finding truth conditions, whereas from the point of view of [ex-
743 pressivism], ... if you want to talk in these terms [i.e., in terms of
744 truth conditions], then the best thing to say about ‘*X is Φ* ’ in the
745 cases considered is that its truth-condition is that *X is Φ* —but
746 this will not be the way to understand matters [i.e., to say any-
747 thing interesting about the meaning of the claims in question].³³
748

749 In my own early criticism of RDR,³⁴ I also argued that the right place
750 for pragmatic factors was in use conditions, not truth or content con-
751 ditions. Among other considerations, I argued that use conditions
752 make better sense of actual usage, in cases exhibiting no-fault dis-
753 agreements (e.g., again, about whether Canberra is a bustling
754 place). I also argued that the content condition view is incoherent,
755 *as a global view* – something has to go in the background, pragmatically
756 presupposed but not stated, on pain of vicious regress. RDR
757 cannot be a model for a global pragmatism.
758

759 *5.1 GE is not Idealism*

761 Some proponents of RDR may have felt that it offered an attractive al-
762 ternative to two ways of denying that claims about colour, value, and
763 the like, are answerable, as they seem on the face to be, to a reality
764 beyond ourselves. On the one side (so such proponents thought)
765 was expressivism, which they took as the view that such utterances
766 are not answerable *to anything*, not being genuine claims in the first
767 place. On the other side was an unattractive idealism, which regarded
768 such claims as entirely subjective – entirely ‘about ourselves’, in some
769 sense, and so not answerable to *external* reality for that reason.
770

771
772 ³³ Simon Blackburn, *Essays in Quasi-Realism* (New York: Oxford
773 University Press, 1993), 10–11.

774 ³⁴ Huw Price, ‘Two Paths to Pragmatism’, *op. cit.*, note 28.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

775 I have explained why contemporary expressivists, especially global
776 expressivists, would reject the characterisation of their view on which
777 the first part of this contrast depends. It may be helpful to finish by
778 saying why this does not put them on the other side, saddled with an
779 unattractive idealism. Part of what needs to be said has already been
780 mentioned. GE doesn't take moral claims to be about anything other
781 than what they seem to be about, but for the most banal of reasons:
782 'about' simply isn't one of GE's words, in any interesting sense.

783 At this point the concern that GE is 'really' a form of idealism tends
784 to surface as the concern that to the extent that expressivism allows
785 moral facts, it makes them 'depend on us' in some implausible way.
786 The expressivist is thought to be committed to claims such as
787 these: kicking dogs is only wrong because we disapprove of it; if we
788 approved of it, it would be good.

789 The expressivist responds with some careful distinctions. If the
790 question is what *we* should say about an imagined world, similar to
791 ours except that people enjoy kicking dogs, then of course we assess
792 by our own standards. What those unpleasant imagined people are
793 doing is wrong, even though they enjoy or approve of it. (Sadly, we
794 can also think of plenty of non-imaginary cases of this kind.)

795 So in this case we assess 'from the inside' – from our own stand-
796 point. If we leave this standpoint behind we can talk about what
797 those other folk would *say*, but not about whether what they say
798 would be *true*. Attempting to do that involves a kind of use-mention
799 confusion. Folk who approved of kicking dogs might *say* that it was
800 'good', and their term might have a very similar expressive function
801 as ours, but this licenses no sense in which it is appropriate to say
802 that the *facts* would be different – for there's no stance to talk
803 about the facts other than our own.

804 805 806 **6. Postscript: Two Allies**

807
808 This concludes our tour of five ways to disagree with global expressi-
809 vism. To finish, let me mention two views that I take to be very con-
810 genial to GE. One is very well-known, one less so.

811 812 813 *6.1 Pittsburgh Pragmatism*

814
815 To introduce the first of these views, recall the local expressivist's
816 bifurcation thesis, and frame it, as we did at some points above, in
817 terms of content. QR can be thought of as claiming to explain how

Huw Price

818 there can be assertions with (say) moral contents, even though the job
819 of moral claims is not being characterised (in any substantial
820 theoretical sense) as that of keeping track of any corresponding
821 aspects of reality. The content of moral judgements cannot be consid-
822 ered to be ‘upstream’ of moral discourse, in other words, in some
823 realm to which the ability to use moral terms gives us access.
824 Rather it emerges ‘downstream’, a product of the practice, and
825 when cast in these terms, the task of QR is to tell us how the trick
826 is turned.

827 Generalising this thought, we can the bifurcation thesis as the proposi-
828 tional that we need two kinds of accounts of propositional content.
829 For some of our claims and beliefs, on this view, something proposi-
830 tion-shaped or content-like lies upstream, needed to explain what it
831 is to hold a belief with that content. For others claims and beliefs,
832 propositional content emerges only downstream, being explained as
833 Blackburn wants explain the content of moral or modal language –
834 i.e., in terms of what we *do* with the language and concepts in
835 question.

836 Characterised in these terms, GE amounts to the view that the
837 downstream model is appropriate in all cases. But here is Brandom,
838 making what I take to be the same distinction in terms of direction
839 of explanation:

840 An account of the conceptual might explain the use of concepts in
841 terms of a priori understanding of conceptual *content*. Or it might
842 pursue a complementary explanatory strategy, beginning with a
843 story about the practice or activity of applying concepts, and
844 elaborating on that basis an understanding of conceptual
845 content. The first can be called a *platonist* strategy, and the
846 second a *pragmatist* (in this usage, a species of functionalist)
847 strategy.... The pragmatist direction of explanation, by contrast,
848 seeks to explain how the use of linguistic expressions, or the
849 functional role of intentional states, confers conceptual content
850 on them.³⁵

851
852 Brandom says that his own view is ‘a kind of conceptual pragmatism’:
853 ‘It offers an account of knowing (or believing, or saying) *that* such
854 and such is the case in terms of knowing *how* (being able) to do some-
855 thing ... —in general, the content by the act, rather than the other way
856 around.’³⁶ Again:

857
858 ³⁵ Robert Brandom, *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to*
859 *Inferentialism* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 4.

860 ³⁶ Op. cit., 4.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

861 Starting with an account of what one is *doing* in making a claim,
862 [pragmatism] seeks to elaborate from it an account of what is said,
863 the content or proposition—something that can be thought of in
864 terms of truth conditions—to which one commits oneself by
865 making a speech act.³⁷

866 Unhindered by the piecemeal starting points of Blackburn’s Humean
867 expressivism, and committed to a general inferentialism about
868 meaning, Brandom simply takes for granted that this kind of pragma-
869 tism should be global in nature. There is no bifurcation. Content is
870 everywhere downstream of usage. So Brandom counts as a global
871 expressivist, in my terminology.
872

874 6.2 Cambridge Pragmatism 875

876 The most basic difference between GE and all the above rivals is that
877 GE sticks consistently to the view that the appropriate philosophical
878 stance is the meta-linguistic one, not the metaphysical one (and that
879 the former is *nowhere* inappropriate – that marks the contrast with
880 LE). I have used various terms for this contrast in various places.
881 In *Facts and the Function of Truth* I contrasted the project of offering
882 an ‘analysis’ of truth with that of offering an ‘explanation’ – the latter,
883 the one that I recommended, being what I am here calling the meta-
884 linguistic approach. In other places I have drawn a contrast between
885 ‘metaphysics’ and ‘anthropology’, marking more or less the same
886 distinction.
887

888 In recent work³⁸ I have noted that when F. P. Ramsey comes this
889 way, he speaks of psychology, not anthropology. Here he is in
890 ‘General Propositions and Causality’, reflecting on a possible
891 response to an account of causation he has just sketched – an
892 account that we would now call expressivist, or pragmatist.

893 What we have said is, I think, a sufficient outline of the answers to
894 the relevant problems of analysis, but it is apt to leave us muddled
895 and unsatisfied as to what seems the main question—a question
896 not of psychological analysis but of metaphysics which is ‘Is
897 causation a reality or a fiction; and, if a fiction, is it useful or mis-
898 leading, arbitrary or indispensable?’³⁹
899

900 ³⁷ Op. cit., 12.

901 ³⁸ In Huw Price ‘Epilogue: Ramsey’s Ubiquitous Pragmatism’, op. cit.
902 note 29, and ‘Wilfrid Sellars meets Cambridge Pragmatism’, op. cit. note 30.

903 ³⁹ Op. cit. note 13, 141.

Huw Price

904 Ramsey doesn't address this concern directly, but I think it is clear
905 that his view is that metaphysics is the wrong mode of enquiry, in
906 this case. The illuminating enquiry is the one he calls 'psychological
907 analysis' – an investigation into how we come to think and talk in
908 causal terms, conducted in a manner that we do not presuppose
909 that the helpful answer will lead us back to the objects. (In other
910 words, we do not presuppose that the answer will be 'We talk this
911 way because we are keeping track of the causal facts', or anything of
912 that kind.)

913 I have dubbed this stance 'Cambridge Pragmatism', noting that in
914 can be found in places in the work of many later Cambridge figures –
915 and not just the obvious ones such as Blackburn and Wittgenstein.
916 Other examples include Mellor on tensed language, Anscombe on
917 the first-person, Craig on knowledge, von Wright on causation, and
918 Bernard Williams, arguably, on truth itself. Most of these figures
919 count in my terms as local pragmatists, or local expressivists. As for
920 Ramsey himself, Cheryl Misak argues that under the influence of
921 Peirce, Ramsey was already a global Cambridge Pragmatist.⁴⁰
922 While I have expressed some reservations about this claim,⁴¹ I
923 think it is clear that Ramsey was moving in that direction. As
924 Richard Holton and I have argued,⁴² he would have been pushed
925 there by factors related to what we now call the rule-following consid-
926 erations. In the terminology of the present paper, then, Ramsey is at
927 least a *proto*-Global Expressivist.

928
929 *University of Cambridge*
930 hp331@cam.ac.uk
931

932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941 ⁴⁰ Cheryl Misak, 'Ramsey's 1929 Pragmatism', in Cheryl Misak and
942 Huw Price, eds., *The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in the British Long*
943 *Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 11–28.

944 ⁴¹ See Huw Price 'Epilogue: Ramsey's Ubiquitous Pragmatism', op.
945 cit. note 28, 152–156.

946 ⁴² Richard Holton and Huw Price, 'Ramsey on Saying and Whistling: a
Discordant Note', *Noûs* 37 (2003), 325–341.